Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 19
Issue 1 Fall 2009

Article 7

Lessening Cumulative Burdens on the Right to
Vote: A Legislative Response to Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board
Neil P. Kelly

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Kelly, Neil P. (2009) "Lessening Cumulative Burdens on the Right to Vote: A Legislative Response to Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 19: Iss. 1, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol19/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

NOTE
LESSENING CUMULATIVE BURDENS ON THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY
ELECTION BOARD
Neil P. Kelly*
Many scholars and commentators expected the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board to settle the debate
over the constitutionalityof mandatoryphoto identification laws for prospective voters. While the Court's splintered plurality decision upheld
the Indianalaw at issue in the case, it did not resolve this largersubstantive debate; rather, the decision has exacerbated the confusion in the
lower courts surrounding the constitutional analysis of strict voter identification laws.
This Note considers the path forward for voting rights advocates in
the aftermath of the Crawford decision. This Note analyzes the fractured
voting of the Justices in Crawford and considers the prospectsfor future
legal challenges to strict voter identification laws. Ultimately, this Note
argues that a litigation strategy will not be sufficient on its own to vindicate the right to vote for vulnerable voting populations, and recommends
that voting rights advocates pursue a legislative response at the federal
level as a complement to the ongoing legal challenges to possibly unconstitutional voter identification schemes.
The policy proposalsthis Note advances-broaderopportunitiesfor
voter registration, and universal voter registration-wouldnot directly
remedy the flaws of strict voter identification laws, but, to different degrees, each policy would help alleviate the cumulative burdens such laws
impose on the right to vote for the most vulnerable voting populations in
the nation.
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INTRODUCTION

As the Supreme Court prepared to hear oral arguments in Crawford
v. Marion County Election Bd.,1 expectations were high for what some
legal commentators anticipated would be the "most important elections
case since Bush v. Gore."'2 Barely seven years after it arguably decided
1 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
2 See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Supreme Court Preview: The Most Important Elections Case
Since Bush v. Gore, http://www.acslaw.org/archive/200801?page=5 (Jan. 9, 2008, 8:30 EST)
[hereinafter Levitt, Supreme Court Preview] ("The Court's opinion is likely to have an impact
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one of the closest presidential elections in history, and in the middle of
what many considered the most important presidential campaign in a
generation, the Court was on the verge of deciding the constitutionality
of one of the most controversial election law responses to Bush v.
governGore3-an Indiana law requiring all in-person voters to present
4
ballot.
a
cast
to
order
in
ment-issued photo identification
As of the 2000 presidential election, only eleven states required all
in-person voters to present some form of identity verification before they
cast ballots. 5 While allegations of partisan voter fraud and the use of
election laws as a means of manipulating the electorate have a storied
history in American politics, 6 calls from some groups for stricter voter
identification laws reached a crescendo in the aftermath of the disputed
presidential election of 2000. 7 Congress responded to the myriad election problems that were manifest after the 2000 election with the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA)8-a wide ranging piece of legislation that reflected a series of compromises between congressional Democrats interested in improving voter-access to the polls and Republicans
focused on fraud prevention. 9 Among its provisions, HAVA included a
requirement that all first-time in-person voters in a federal election prefar beyond Indiana. It will refine the standard determining what states must show in order to
justify a direct burden on the ability to cast a valid vote. And in so doing, it will set the ground
rules governing which eligible American citizens will be able to exercise their right to vote,
and which eligible citizens will not, in 2008 and beyond.").
3 See Samuel P. Langholz, Note, Fashioninga Constitutional Voter-Identification Re-

quirement, 93 IowA L. REV. 731, 745-46 (2008).
4 See IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1 (2006).
5 ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION REFORM: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HASN'T AND WHY:

2000-2006, at 16 (2006), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/2006.annual.report.Final.pdf (describing voter identification requirements in each state in 2000).
6 See, e.g., ANDREW GUMBEL, STEAL THIS VOTE: DIRTY ELECTIONS AND THE ROTTEN
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Nation Books 2005); Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter
Fraudor Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an Inconsistent Considerationof Election Fraud,44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (2009) (surveying the history of federal efforts to address
frauds in the electoral system); Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REv.631,
638-39 (2007) (describing Richard Nixon's "Operation Eagle Eye," an "anti-fraud" campaign
designed to suppress turnout in the 1960 presidential election); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 453, 456-61 (2008) [hereinafter
Tokaji, Voter Registration] (surveying the history of voter registration laws and their frequent
use as tools of disenfranchisement); see also Atiba R. Ellis, The Cost of the Vote: Poll Taxes,
Voter Identification Laws, and the Price of Democracy, 86 DENv. U. L. REV. 1023, 1036-50

(2009) (arguing that many of the restrictions on voter eligibility are a means to prevent people
of lower socioeconomic status from voting).
7 See Overton, supra note 6, at 638; Richard L. Hasen, Fraud Reform? How Efforts to
ID Voting Problems Have Become a PartisanMess, SLATE, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.slate.

com/id/2136776.
8 Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
9 Overton, supra note 6, at 639; see also Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at
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sent some form of identification at their polling location. 10 While
HAVA's voter identification requirement is limited in scope-it only applies to voters registering by mail, and those who have not previously
voted in the state1 - its passage, and the conditioning of much federal
funding on meeting its requirements,' 2 put election reform at the top of
13
many state legislative agendas.
The states responded-by 2008, thirty-four states had enacted some
type of voter identification law, most of which went beyond HAVA's
minimum requirements. 14 Calls for mandatory photo identification laws
had intensified after such laws were partially endorsed by the CarterBaker Commission, 15 a bi-partisan task force established to assess weaknesses in election systems across the country and to recommend legisla16
tive remedies.
However, the constitutionality of photo identification requirements
remained in doubt in early 2008.17 Voting rights advocates had challenged photo identification statutes in numerous states, 18 and had been
successful in enjoining their enforcement in three states. 19 These advocates claimed that, in addition to violating state constitutions and federal
statutory law, such statutes were unconstitutional becuase they consti10 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A) (2006); Overton, supra note 6, at 639; Tokaji, Voter
Registration, supra note 6, at 473.
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A); Overton, supra note 6, at 639; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 473.
12 See Benson, supra note 6, at 11.
13 See Langholz, supra note 3, at 747-48.
14 See id. at 748-49 & nn.92-96 (listing the states and their respective requirements); see
also NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, REQUIEMENTS FOR VOTER
IDENTIFICATION (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/ElectionsCampaigns/
StateRequirementsforVoterlD/tabid/16602/Default.aspx (last visited Oct. 1, 2009) (listing current requirements).
15 See COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S.
ELECTIONS 18-21 (2005) [hereinafter "CARTER-BAKER REPORT"], available at http://
www.american.edu/ia/cfer/report/full-report.pdf; see also Overton, supra note 6, at 634. But
see Overton, supra note 6 (explaining why Professor Overton, a Commission member, dissented from Carter-Baker Commission's endorsement of photo identification requirements).
16 See Overton, supra note 6, at 633.
17 See Bryan P. Jensen, Comment, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board: The
Missed Opportunity to Remedy the Ambiguity and Unpredictabilityof Burdick, 86 DENV. U. L.
REV. 535, 544 (2009) (stating that prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, of five
identified lower court cases specifically addressing the constitutionality of voter ID laws, three
courts upheld the laws while two courts struck them down as unconstitutional); Langholz,
supra note 3, at 755.
18 See Langholz, supra note 3, at 755-56 (surveying legal challenges to voter identification laws in Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, and
Ohio).
19 Id.; Jensen, supra note 17, at 544; see Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo.
2006) (per curiam); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005);
ACLU v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D. N.M. 2007), rev'd, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir.
2008).
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tuted a modem poll tax under the Twenty-fourth Amendment and an improper burden on the right to vote under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the federal Constitution. 20 It was in this charged atmosphere that the Supreme Court heard Crawford.
However, the decision in Crawford did not settle the ultimate question over the substantive constitutionality of mandatory photo identification laws. 2 1 Instead, the Indiana law survived after six Justices voted to
uphold it, but with the three concurring Justices disagreeing with the constitutional analysis of the lead opinion,22 and the three dissenting Justices
all finding the law unconstitutional. 23 Crucially, the lead opinion hinged
on the holding that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to
support their facial challenge to the law's constitutionality. 24 While the
ruling on these grounds severely limits the avenues available for voting
rights advocates to challenge such laws, 25 the Court did not completely
foreclose challenges to strict voter identification laws by future plaintiffs
who could present evidence of specific harms or burdens on their right to
vote. 26 Indeed, after the Crawford decision, challenges to the constitu27
tionality of photo identification laws continued across the country.
This Note considers the path forward for voting rights advocates in
the aftermath of Crawford, particularly in light of how the Justices' votes
structured the decision. This Note highlights how the fractured plurality
decision has severely hampered litigation efforts by voting rights advocates to alleviate the burdens that strict voter identification laws impose
on vulnerable voting populations, and recommends voting rights advocates complement these efforts by attempting to secure passage of federal
legislation that would help alleviate the cumulative burdens on these voters' right to vote. Part I presents a brief introduction to strict voter identification laws in the United States, the policy debate surrounding their
enactment, and their role as one of the most divisive issues confronting
advocates of broad election reform. Part II discusses the Crawford decision and the effects of how the Supreme Court Justices voted, particu20 See Langholz, supra note 3, at 755; see also Jensen, supra note 17, at 545 (discussing
the consolidated complaints in Crawford).
21 See infra Part lI.D.
22 See infra Part II.C.2.b.
23 See infra Part II.C.2.c.
24 See infra Part II.C.2.a.
25 See infra part II.E.
26 See id.
27 See Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Photo Identification at the
Polls Through an Examination of ProvisionalBalloting, 24 J.L. & POL. 475, 475-76 (2008);
Amanda Bronstad, Voter ID Challenges to Continue Across U.S., LAW.COM, May 27, 2008,
http://www.law.comljsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202421704685 (quoting one challenging attorney: "[T]here's no question that Crawford changes the landscape. But we simply
don't think it impacts the essential issues that are inherent to the challenges to the Albuquerque
ordinance.").
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larly in light of the emerging disfavor the Roberts Court has shown for
facial constitutional challenges, and how legal challenges to strict voter
identification laws are severely hamstrung by Crawford and other recent
Roberts Court decisions. Part III proposes that while voting rights advocates need not abandon litigation strategies, advocates should devote energy and resources to securing a policy response whereby new federal
legislation addressing voter registration could help lessen the cumulative
burdens on the right to vote, particularly for those voters most affected
by strict voter identification laws.
I.

A.

THE RISE OF MANDATORY PHOTOGRAPHIC VOTER IDENTIFICATION

From Voter Registration to Voter Identification

The history of voter registration and identification requirements
largely tracks the expansion of suffrage, and its complications, in the
United States. 2 8 After independence, when the right to vote was limited
to land-owning white males, those who qualified to vote were generally
allowed to do so without any registration or identity verification. 29 As
suffrage expanded and the number of qualified voters grew, calls for
voter registration rose, 30 and the debate over voter registration-and in
particular the complaints of fraud and disenfranchisement-entered the
public realm. 3 1 States enacted voter registration laws, and for various
purposes-in the North to combat fraud by urban political machines and
also to prevent immigrants from voting; in the South, first to prevent
former Confederates from voting, then, alongside voter "qualification"
laws, to disenfranchise African-American voters. 32 These goals-the
prevention of fraud and the suppression of disfavored groups-were
33
largely met.

28

For more detailed examinations of the history of voter registration laws, see Dayna L.

Cunningham, Who Are to Be the Electors?A Reflection on the History of Voter Registration in
the United States, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 370, 370-88 (1991); Ellis, supra note 6, at
1036-45; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 456-61; Langholz, supra note 3, at

741-53.
29 See Cunningham, supra note 28, at 373; Ellis, supra note 6, at 1037-38; Langholz,

supra note 3, at 741-42.
30 See FRANCIS PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE: AND WHY
POLITICIANS WANT IT THAT WAY 37 (Beacon Press 2000); Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra
note 6, at 456-58; Langholz, supra note 3, at 742.
31 See Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 456-58.
32 See Cunningham, supra note 28, at 374-85; Ellis, supra note 6, at 1041-44; Tokaji,
Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 457-61; Langholz, supra note 3, at 742.
33 See Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 458-59 (citing ALEXANDER KEYSSAR,
THE Rwrrr TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 157

(Basic Books 2000), for the proposition that "registration laws reduced fraudulent voting [and]
kept large numbers (probably millions) of eligible voters from the polls").
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Voter registration laws remained largely the domain of state law
until the federal Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts outlawed the discriminatory use of registration requirements to disenfranchise AfricanAmerican voters. 34 Apart from these federal mandates, and the Warren
Court's interventions, 35 for much of the twentieth century states differed
wildly in their threshold registration and identification requirements for
36
voting.
The federal government intervened again in state voter registration
law with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 37 otherwise known as the "Motor Voter Law" due to its provision requiring
states to permit voters to register when applying for a driver's license. 38
Enacted in light of widespread declines in voter turnout, Congress
promulgated the NVRA with the goal of increasing registration among
all voters, not just racial minorities. 39 In addition to establishing a nationally-accepted, uniform registration form, 40 and regulating how the
states could maintain voter registration lists, 4 the NVRA greatly expanded the opportunities for eligible citizens to register to vote. 42 Complementing the driver's license provision, the NVRA mandates that state
offices that provide public assistance or disability services also offer
voter registration opportunities and assistance in completing these forms
to those receiving such services. 43 After the NVRA's passage, registra44
tion numbers of voters in lower socioeconomic positions rose strongly.
However, proponents of stricter voter eligibility requirements criticized the NVRA for limiting states' ability to remove registered voters
from the voter rolls due to a period of non-voting; 45 for requiring states
to attempt to contact inactive voters, and giving such voters a grace pe34 See Cunningham, supra note 28, at 388-89; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6,
at 461-66; Langholz, supra note 3, at 742-43.
35 See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (abolishing the poll tax); Ellis,
supra note 6, at 1047-50.
36 See Langholz, supra note 3, at 742-43.
37 Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973gg-1973gg-10 (2006)).
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 468; Langholz,
supra note 3, at 743.
39 Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 467.
40 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-4a, 1973gg-7; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at
468.
41 See Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 469; infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
42 Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 467-69.
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-5(a)(2), 1973gg-5(a)(4) (2006); Tokaji, Voter Registration,
supra note 6, at 468.
44 Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, 469-70.
45 See 42 U.S.C. §1973gg-(6)(b); Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 469;
Langholz, supra note 3, at 743.
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riod, before removing them from the voter rolls; 46 for requiring states to
accept mail-in registration; 4 7 and for allowing voters who recently
moved within a state to vote in either the precinct of their old or new
address. 4 8 Critics claimed these provisions caused voter lists to become
"bloated" and presented an opportunity for persons to show up at polling
places and vote in the name of someone else-either because that person
49
moved, died, committed a felony, or never existed in the first place.
These critics claimed that a photo identification requirement at the polls
50
would prevent this from occurring.
As part of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), 51 Congress
required each state to update its voter registration systems by creating a
centralized statewide database of registered voters, the accuracy of which
was to be ensured by regular maintenance by the state and the sharing of
information among various state agencies and with the federal government. 52 In addition, HAVA added the aforementioned voter identifica53
tion requirement for all first-time voters in a federal election in a state,
and increased the threshold identification needed for registration under
54
the nationwide registration guidelines.
As the states implemented HAVA's requirements, many enacted
55
voter identification laws that exceeded HAVA's minimum standard.
Professor Spencer Overton has classified these restrictions under five
broad categories: no documentary identification required; documentary
identification requested, not required; photo identification requested, not
required; documentary identification required; and photo identification as
an absolute condition to voting. 5 6 In states that require no documentary
evidence at the polls beyond HAVA's requirements for first-time voters,
poll workers may verify voters' identities by myriad methods; poll workers may require a voter to sign an affidavit of identity, swear an oath,
46 See 42 U.S.C. §1973gg-6(c)-(d); Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 469;
Langholz, supra note 3, at 743.
47 See 42 U.S.C. §1973gg-4; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 468; Langholz,
supra note 3, at 743-44.
48 See 42 U.S.C. §1973gg-6(e); Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 469;
Langholz, supra note 3, at 743-44.
49 See Overton, supra note 6, at 638; Langholz, supra note 3, at 744; see also Benson,
supra note 6, at 10-11.
50 Overton, supra note 6, at 638.
51 Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(2)-(5) (2006); Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at
471; Langholz, supra note 3, at 745-46.
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(2)(A); supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(5); Benson, supra note 6, at 11.
55 See Langholz, supra note 3, at 748-49 & nn.92-96 (listing the states and their respective requirements); NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 14.

56 See Overton, supra note 6, at 639-41. For an alternative classification of state voter
identification laws, see Langholz, supra note 3, at 748-51 and accompanying footnotes.
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recite her birth-date and address to poll worker, or sign a poll-book with
the signature compared to the signature on the voter's file. 57 In states
where a poll worker may request documentary identification, but where
it is not required, a voter can substantiate her identity through the production of numerous kinds of documentation, ranging from a driver's
license with a photograph to a utility bill.58 If the voter does not have
such documentation, she can attest to her identity using one of the aforementioned methods. 59 The same general rule applies in states where
polls workers may request photographic identification, but where it is not
required, but often with a higher standard of secondary verification, however.60 In those states that require documentary identification, acceptable identification usually includes any of the kinds of documentation
that would suffice to satisfy HAVA's minimum requirement, but as applied to all voters. 61 At the time Crawford was heard, Florida, Georgia,
and Indiana were the only states that required photo identification from
62
all in-person voters.
B.

The Policy Debate: Protecting or Suppressing the Vote?

Strict voter identification laws, and mandatory photo identification
laws in particular, have been the subject of intense public and scholarly
debate in recent years. Even on the predicate definitional point, proponents and opponents of such laws disagree as to how to define "voter
fraud."'6 3 Proponents define the term broadly to include all manner of
illegal activity surrounding the casting and counting of votes. 64 Opponents assert that this is an intentional conflating of problems-including
cases of clerical error, innocent mistake, or simple negligence-by proponents of such laws in an attempt to raise alarm in voters as to the
57 Overton, supra note 6, at 640.
58 Id.
59 See id. at 640-41.
60 See id. at 641.
61 See id.

62 See Ian Urbina, Decision Is Likely to Spur Voter ID Laws in More States, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2008, at A11.
63 See, e.g., JUSTIN LEvITr, THE TRUTH ABOUT VOTER FRAUD 4 (2007), http://truthabout
fraud.org/pdf/TruthAboutVoterFraud.pdf ("There are many such problems that are improperly
lumped under the umbrella of 'voter fraud."'); see also Benson, supra note 6, at 4-7 (discussing "[tihe absence of a clear legal definition of election fraud"); id. at 4 n.21 (citing U.S.
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM'N, ELECTION CRIMES: AN INITIAL REVIEW AND RECOMMENDA-

TIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 11-12 (2006) (stating there is no uniform definition of election

fraud)). For one proposed reformulation of these definitions, see Benson, supra note 6 (distinguishing between "voter-initiated" fraud and "voter-targeted" fraud).
64 See, e.g., Langholz, supra note 3, at 735 & n.20 ("[J]ust as consumer fraud need not
be committed by consumers, but rather is focused on fraud against consumers, so too should
voter fraud include all conduct directed toward defrauding lawful voters of the weight of their
votes-whether committed by another voter, an election official, or a campaign worker.").
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alleged prevalence of misconduct in the election system. 65 In contrast,
opponents use the more precise definition of the term to encompass only
"the intentional corruption of the electoral process by voters."'66 Opponents of strict voter identification laws are also clear to distinguish between in-person voter fraud and other forms of voter fraud, the former
67
being the only kind that photo identification laws address.
Substantively, the disagreements only worsen. Opponents of
mandatory photo identification laws, in particular, forcefully challenge
the primary asserted justification for such laws-to combat in-person
voter fraud-by citing the lack of evidence of widespread in-person
voter fraud. 68 Concededly, proponents of mandatory photo identification
laws are able to produce examples of voter registrationfraud-where
persons turn in false or fraudulent registrations for persons who do not
exist-but evidence of these fraudulently registered identities actually
voting is virtually non-existent. 69 Indeed, the best evidence available of
fraudulent in-person voting is anecdotal at best. 70 In response, propo-

nents of mandatory photo identification laws claim that this lack of evidence of in-person voter fraud is a result of there being no effective
means for detecting and combating such conduct, especially in jurisdictions that do not require identification of putatively registered voters at
polling locations. 7 1
Furthermore, opponents of mandatory photo identification laws cite
the suppressive effect these laws have on voter turnout, especially among
potential voters who are low-income, minority, disabled, or elderly, and
65 See, e.g., LEVrIrT, supra note 63, at 4, 7-11 (arguing that allegations of voter fraud are
widely exaggerated, divert attention from more pressing problems with elections, and are used
to justify policies that disenfranchise voters); Overton, supra note 6, at 645-46 (recounting
how a widely touted instance of "double voting" in Milwaukee in 2005 resulted in zero indictments for voter fraud by the Republican-appointed United States Attorney, because the discrepancies were actually caused by clerical errors and individuals with similar names).
66 LORRAINE C. MINNITE,PROJECT VOTE, THE POLITICS OF VOTER FRAUD 6 (2007), http:/
/projectvote.org/images/publications/Policy%20Reports%20and%20Guides/Politics-of-Voter
_FraudFinal.pdf.
67 See, e.g., LEVITr, supra note 63, at 6; Overton, supra note 6, at 649-50.
68 See, e.g., Benson, supra note 6, at 7 & n.31 (citing U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE
COMM'N, supra note 63, at 15; Eric Lipton & Ian Urbina, In 5-Year Effort, Scant Evidence of
Voter Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007, at Al); Overton, supra note 6, at 649-50; LEvrrr,
supra note 63; MINNITE, supra, note 66, at 3.
69 See Overton, supra note 6, at 649-50; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 495.
In the 2008 presidential election, much was made about the false voter registrations turned in
by workers for the nonprofit ACORN, who were paid a set amount for each voter they registered. See Michael Falcone, ACORN Replies to Questions About Role with Voters, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A24; Joe Mandak, 7 PA. ACORN Workers Facing Voter-Form
Charges, Assoc. PRESS, May 7, 2009 ("[S]even have been charged with either forging, illegally soliciting or illegally filling out voter-registration cards in the lead-up to the 2008
election.").
70 See Overton, supra note 6, at 644-50.
71 See id. at 653-54.
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less likely to possess acceptable identification. 7 2 Yet, proponents respond to these charges by stating that there is no credible evidence that
mandatory photo identification laws actually suppress voter turnout in
these groups. 73 This conflicted empirical record 74 creates problems for
75
voting rights advocates beyond the public policy debate.
Suffused throughout these debates are outright allegations by each
side that its opponent is intentionally manipulating the electoral system
for purely partisan ends. The primarily Democratic opposition notes that
the groups most affected by photo identification requirements lean Democratic, and claim that Republican-lead efforts to enact such laws are
merely an attempt to suppress Democratic tumout. 76 Indeed, the sharp
72 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 6, at 1026 (arguing that the economic costs such requirements place on certain voters will structurally exclude lower socioeconomic voters); M.V.
Hood I & Charles S. Bullock III,
Worth a Thousand Words? An Analysis of Georgia'sVoter
Identification Statute, 36 Am.POL. RES. 555 (2008); Matt A. Barreto, Stephen A. Nuno &
Gabriel R. Sanchez, Voter ID Requirements and the Disenfranchisements of Latino, Black and
Asian Voters (Sept. 1, 2007), available at http://faculty.washington.edu/mbarreto/research/
VoterIDAPSA.pdf (examining exit polls to find that immigrants and minority voters were
less likely to be able to provide identification at the polls); Timothy Vercellotti & David Andersen, Protecting the Franchise, or Restricting It? The Effects of Voter Identification Requirements on Turnout, available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download file_
50903.pdf (finding suppressive effect of stricter voter identification laws, especially among
racial minorities); Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter ID and Turnout, EQUAL VOTE, Feb. 22, 2007, http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/blogs/tokaji/2007/02/voter-id-and-turnout.html ('"The exclusionary effect of
some ID laws arises from the fact that a significant number of citizens don't have governmentissued photo ID. Previous research suggests that some groups of voters-including people of
color, poor voters, and elderly voters-are likely to be disproportionately affected, since
they're less likely to have driver's licenses."). But see Robert S. Erikson & Lorraine C. Minnite, Modeling Problems in the Voter Identification-Voter Turnout Debate, 8 ELECTION L. J.
85, 87 (2009) (discussing critiques of the Vercellotti study).
73 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Bob Pastor Responds to my Cater-Baker Op-Ed Criticism, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/010177.html (Feb. 4, 2008, 22:23 EST) (quoting
Carter-Baker Commission Executive Director Robert Pastor as stating that "advocates of voter
ID have had problems in finding cases of voter impersonation, and the critics of voter ID have
had a similar problem finding cases of people who were denied the right to cast a ballot
because they did not have photo IDs"); DAVID B. MUHLHAUSEN & KERI WEBER SIKICH, THE
HERITAGE CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS, NEW ANALYSIS SHOWS VOTER IDENTIFICATION LAWS

Do NOT REDUCE TURNOUT, availableat http://www.heritage.org/researchdegalissues/upload/
cda_07-04.pdf (finding no statistically significant suppressive effect of voter identification
laws on turnout in a state-by-state comparison).
74 See Erikson & Minnite, supra note 72; Lorraine C. Minnite, Finding Election FraudMaybe, 8 ELECTION L. J. 249 (2009); Pitts, supra note 27 (finding inconclusive evidence of
suppression under the Indiana law).
75 See infra Part II.E.
76 See, e.g., Jim Vertuno, Texas Senate Advances Voter ID Bill, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 11,
2009, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6305054.html ("Sen.
Leticia Van de Putte of San Antonio, leader of the [Texas] Senate Democrats, said the [photo
identification] measure is designed to shave about 3 to 4 percentage points off of Democratic
vote totals in Texas just as the party begins to improve its statewide performance."); see also
Jonathan Alter, 'Jim Crawford' Republicans, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2008, available at http://
www.newsweek.com/id/158392; Art Levine, The Republican War on Voting, THE AMERICAN
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partisan divide over photo identification laws is manifested in the fact
that nearly every photo identification law passed since 2000 has been on
an almost purely party line vote, 77 with reviewing judges frequently vot78
ing according to party affiliation as well.
C.

Legal Challenges to Photo Identification Laws

The bitter divide over the merits and effects of strict voter identification laws is mirrored in the inconsistent treatment such laws receive in
the courts. 79 Of the five courts that ruled upon the constitutionality of
photo identification laws before the Supreme Court decided Crawford,
three upheld the state law at issue, while two stuck the law down.80 In
reaching their decisions, the lower courts frequently applied different
standards of constitutional review. 8 1 This inconsistent approach is unsurprising given the Supreme Court's often contradictory analysis in many
cases premised on a claimed burden on the right to vote, including those
beyond the election fraud context. 82 While Crawford presented the
Court with the opportunity not just to settle the question over the substantive constitutionality of mandatory photo identification laws, but also
to clarify much election law jurisprudence, 83 the Court's limited and
fractured response only appears to have exacerbated the legal and policy
debates over strict voter identification laws.
PROSPECT, Apr. 1, 2008, available at http://www.prospect.org/cs/articlesarticle=the-republican-war on voting.
77 See Brief of Amici Curiae of Historians and Other Scholars in Support of Petitioners
at 28, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (Nos. 07-21, 07-25)
(stating that between 2005 and 2007, on ten Republican-introduced voter identification laws,
95% of Republican state legislators voted in support while only 2% of Democratic state legislators did); see, e.g., Jensen, supra note 17, at 556 (citing pure party-line vote on Indiana's
voter identification law).
78 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Undue Burdens on Voter Participation:New Pressures
for a Structural Theory of the Right to Vote?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 643, 646-47 (2008).
79 See Benson, supra note 6, at 5 ("In the absence of an objective, uniform formula to
determine the amount of deference to a legislature that is appropriate, courts tend to an inconsistent review of election fraud.")
80 Jensen, supra note 17, at 544; see Gonzalez v. Arizona, 485 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007);
Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (per curiam); Common Cause/Ga. v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2005); ACLU v. Santillanes, 506 F. Supp. 2d 598 (D.
N.M. 2007), rev'd, 546 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2008); In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007).
81 See Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 143, 171-72 (2008) [hereinafter Douglas, Right to Vote]; Jensen, supra note 17, at
544.
82 See Thomas Basile, Inventing the "Right to Vote" in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 445 (2009) ("The right to vote is a judicial
creation possessing as much force as the Court chooses to accord it in any given case."). See
generally Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81 (arguing that despite the common rhetoric, the
Supreme Court does not always treat the right to vote as fundamental).
83 See Levitt, Supreme Court Preview, supra note 2.
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CRAWFORD V. MARION CouNTY ELECTION BOARD

The Statute: Indiana's Voter ID Law

Enacted in 2005, the statute at issue in Crawford is among the most
stringent in the nation, as it requires all registered voters in Indiana to
present government-issued photographic identification before voting inperson. 84 A voter who does not present photo identification at the polling place is allowed to cast a provisional ballot under the law, but such
ballots are to be counted only if, within ten days of the election, the voter
travels to the local state circuit court to execute an affidavit stating that
she is indigent and unable to obtain proper identification, or presents
such identification at the circuit court and affirms that she cast the provi85
sional ballot.
The Indiana Voter ID Law, as it is commonly known, applies only
to in-person voters, not those who vote absentee by mail, or voters living
in state-licensed facilities such as nursing homes. 86 Under Indiana law,
voters are not required to show photo identification in order to register to
vote, but the state does offer photo identification without charge through
the Bureau of Motor Vehicles for Indiana residents who wish to obtain
one in order to vote and who can establish their residence and identity.8 7
As in almost every other debate over voter identification laws, Indiana's Voter ID Law was passed on a pure party line vote, with all Repub88
licans voting in favor and all Democrats voting against.
B.

The Parties' Arguments

After the passage of the Voter ID Law, the plaintiffs-the Indiana
Democratic Party and Marion County Democratic Central Committee,
two publicly elected officials, and numerous nonprofit organizations that
work on behalf of elderly, disabled, low-income, and minority votersfiled two suits against the state officials responsible for the enforcement
84 See IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1(a) (2006); 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL
RIGHTS AcTs, §2.99 (3d ed. 2008); Benson, supra note 6, at 17; Photo Identification Requirementfor In-Person Voting, 122 HARV. L. REV. 355, 356 (2008)..
85 See IND. CODE §§ 3-11-7.5-2.5, 3-11-7.51, 3-11-8-25.1(d); Basile supra note 82, at
432; Photo Identification Requirementfor In-Person Voting, supra note 84, at 356.
86 See IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1(e); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd. 128 S. Ct.
1610, 1613 (2008); Basile, supra note 82, at 431-32; Ellis, supra note 6, at 1056.
87 See IND. CODE § 9-24-16-10(b); Basile supra note 82, at 432; L. Paige Whitaker, The
Constitutionality of Requiring Photo Identification for Voting: An Analysis of Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board, Cong. Res. Service (May 19, 2008). Indiana added the provision providing for photographic identification free of charge at the same time the Voter ID
Law was passed in order to avoid what would be an almost explicit constitutional violation by
conditioning the ability to vote on the payment of a fee. See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. 1610,
1620-21 & n.4.
88 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623 & n.21; Photo Identification Requirement for InPerson Voting, supra note 84, at 356; see also supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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of the law. 89 The consolidated suits argued that the Voter ID Law was
unconstitutional because it substantially burdened the fundamental right
to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; it was neither a necessary nor appropriate means of preventing election fraud; it arbitrarily disenfranchised voters without the requisite photo identification who
otherwise would be qualified to vote; and it placed an improper burden
on voters who were unable to obtain the requisite identification. 90 These
arguments largely tracked the historic charges by election law experts
and civil and voting rights advocates against the enactment of strict voter
91

identification laws.
The State of Indiana defended the law against these pre-enforcement challenges on the grounds that legitimate legislative concerns for
in-person voter fraud justified the law, and that it was a reasonable exercise of the State's constitutional power to so regulate elections. 92 The
State's arguments essentially tracked the arguments made by those in
93
favor of more restrictive voter identification laws.
C.

The Courts' Responses
1.

Lower Court Decisions

In Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, the District Court granted
summary judgment for the State upholding the Voter ID Law. 9 4 Rejecting the plaintiffs' facial constitutional attack, the court held that the
State's claimed interest in preventing voter fraud provided sufficient justification for the law and the burdens it imposed on certain voters. 9 5 The
District Court found that the plaintiffs had "not introduced evidence of a
single, individual Indiana resident who will be unable to vote as a result
of [the Voter ID Law] or who will have his or her right to vote unduly
burdened by its requirements." 96 Although the plaintiffs had supplied
expert testimony that up to 989,000 registered voters in Indiana did not
possess a driver's license or other acceptable photo identification that
would satisfy the law's requirements, 9 7 the District Court dismissed this
89 See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 783 (S.D. Ind. 2006);
Basile supra note 82, at 432; Whitaker, supra note 87, at 1-2.
90 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614; Basile supra note 82, at 432; Whitaker, supra note
87, at 2.
91 See supra Part I.B.
92 See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 784; Basile supra note 82, at 432.
93 See supra Part I.B.
94 See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 784; Photo Identification Requirement for In-Person
Voting, supra note 84, at 356.
95 See Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 821-26 (S.D. Ind.
2006).
96 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 783; see Whitaker, supra note 87, at 2.
97 See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
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assertion "as utterly incredible and unreliable." 98 Instead, the District
Court estimated that as of the date of the law's passage, approximately
43,000 Indiana residents did not possess suitable government-issued
photo identification. 99 To the District Court, this burden on the population at large was insignificant and, coupled with the fact that the plaintiffs had not identified specific voters who the law would preclude from
voting or unduly burden, was not substantial enough to justify enjoining
the enforcement of the law. t° °
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District
Court's decision.10 1 Judge Richard Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit panel, acknowledged that the law may cause certain harms, but characterized these as purely political and logistical concerns for the plaintiff
Democratic organizations, not cognizable constitutional injuries.' 0 2 Indeed, Judge Posner stated that "no doubt most people who don't have
photo ID are low on the economic ladder and thus, if they do vote, are
more likely to vote for Democratic than Republican candidates,"' 103 but
minimized the harm this would cause, 10 4 and impugned the reasons the
plaintiffs challenged the law as purely political.' 05
Judge Posner rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the law burdened a fundamental right, and thus should be evaluated using strict scrutiny, instead holding that under the balancing test laid out in Burdick v.
Takushi,1° 6 the slighter the burden imposed by the law, the less substan07
tial the reasons the State must provide as justification for the law.'
While Judge Posner acknowledged that the law would deter some voters
from voting due to the identification requirement and the related costs of
complying, he reasoned that the law's overall burden was "slight," and
that therefore, Indiana's asserted interest in preventing voter fraud, while
supported by no evidence of actual occurrences of such fraud in the state,
10 8
justified the law.
98 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 783; see Whitaker, supra note 87, at 2.
99 Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 807; Whitaker, supra note 87, at 2.
100 See Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d at 821-26.
101 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007);
Photo Identification Requirement for In-Person Voting, supra note 84, at 357.
102 See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 954.
103

Id. at 951.

Id.; see also Amitai Etzioni, Supreme Court Tilts Election, Big Time, TALKING Pournrs
MEMO, http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2008/05/02/supreme-court-tilts-electionb/
(May 2, 2008, 14:24 EST).
105 See Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952 (claiming that the plaintiffs' "motivation for the suit is
simply that the law may require the Democratic Party to work harder to get every last one of
their supporters to the polls"); see also Whitaker, supra note 87, at 2.
106 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
107 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2007).
108 See id. at 952-53.
104
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The Supreme Court

A fractured Supreme Court plurality upheld the rejection of the
plaintiffs' facial challenge.' 0 9 However, the splintered nature of the decision has produced uncertainty regarding the level of burdens a voter
identification law must impose before it will be found to be constitutionally defective. 10
a.

The Controlling Opinion

Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy in Crawford's lead opinion, rejected the plaintiffs' facial challenge
to the constitutionality of the law primarily on the basis of insufficient
factual evidence of an unconstitutional burden."' Justice Stevens found
that the plaintiffs' proffered evidence was not enough to justify their fa12
cial constitutional challenge against Indiana's asserted interests."
Justice Stevens framed the case in light of Harperv. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 1 3 the landmark Warren Court case that ruled that poll taxes
were unconstitutional, and that "a State 'violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the affluence of
the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard."' 114 Justice Stevens stated that although the general rule that issued from Harper-that
even rational restrictions on the right to vote were considered invidious,
and subject to strict scrutiny, if they were unrelated to voter qualifications-was still good law, this rule had a caveat such that "'evenhanded
restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself' are not invidious and satisfy the standard set forth in
Harper."'1 1 5 In evaluating such "evenhanded restrictions," courts must
"identify and evaluate the interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden [on the right to vote] imposed by its rule, and then
109 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).
110 See infra notes 164-68 and accompanying text; see also Justin Levitt, CrawfordMore RhetoricalBark than Legal Bite?, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, May 2, 2009, http://

www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/crawford-more-rhetorical-bark-than-egal-bite/ [hereinafter Levitt, More Rhetorical Bark]; Richard L. Hasen, Initial Thoughts on the Supreme
Court's Opinion in Crawford, the Indiana Voter Identification Case, Election Law Blog, http://
electionlawblog.org/archives/010701.html (April 28, 2008, 8:17 EST).
111 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616 ("[Tjhe evidence in the record is not sufficient to
support a facial attack on the validity of the entire statute .... "); see also Ellis, supra note 6, at
1057; Levitt, More Rhetorical Bark, supra note 110.
112 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1623; see also Ellis, supra note 6, at 1057; Levitt, More
Rhetorical Bark, supra note 110.
113 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
114 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663, 666 (1966)). But cf Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 154-55 (arguing that the
lead opinion misconstrued Harper).
115 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
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make the 'hard judgment,"' as to the constitutionality of such laws.1 16
Burdick defined this process to compel courts "evaluating a constitutional challenge to an election regulation [to] weigh the asserted injury to
the right to vote against the 'precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule."" 17
As such, Justice Stevens considered the interests Indiana claimed
the Voter ID Law advanced-election modernization, prevention of
voter fraud, and "safeguarding voter confidence."' 1 8 Justice Stevens
considered Indiana's asserted interest in preventing voter fraud by quoting from the Carter-Baker Commission on Federal Election Reform:
There is no evidence of extensive fraud in U.S. elections
or of multiple voting, but both occur, and it could affect
the outcome of a close election. The electoral system
cannot inspire public confidence if no safeguards exist to

deter or detect fraud or to confirm the identity of voters.
Photo identification cards currently are needed to board
a plane, enter federal buildings, and cash a check. Voting is equally important. 119
While the Voter ID Law was intended to address "in-person voter
impersonation at polling places,"'120 Justice Stevens admitted that "the
record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history." 12' Although Justice Stevens attempted to
mitigate this fact by claiming that "flagrant examples of such fraud in
other parts of the country have been documented throughout the Nation's
history," and "that occasional examples have surfaced in recent years,"
the evidence he cited in support of these propositions was nineteenth
century New York in the heyday of Tammany Hall, and one confirmed
instance of in-person voter fraud in the 2004 Washington State gubernatorial election. 122 Yet, despite this extremely thin evidentiary record,
116 Id.
117

Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).

118 Id.

at 1617.

119 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618 (quoting CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 15, at
136-37). The lead opinion's reliance on the Commission and its assertions have raised numerous concerns, not least of which are the often slipshod historical assertions made, such as the
quoted portion. See Justin Levitt, Crawford-Justthe Facts, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,

Apr. 30, 2008, http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/archives/ust

the facts/ [hereinafter Levitt,

Just the Facts] ("[T]he Court's Indiana voter ID opinion was grounded not in truth, but in
truthiness. If it sounds right in your gut, it must be correct-no matter what the facts actually
are.").
120 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1618-19.
121

Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2008).

122

Id. at 1619 & n.l1-12.
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Justice Stevens did not scrutinize the State's putative interests. 23 Indeed, Justice Stevens declared that the existence of "inflated voters rolls
[provides] a neutral and nondiscriminatory reason supporting the State's
24
decision to require photo identification."'1
While the Court deferred to Indiana's interests despite a thin evidentiary record of support, on the other side of the balance was the plaintiffs'
claimed burdens on the right to vote. After dismissing the burden the
photo identification requirement places on "most voters" as insubstantial, 125 Justice Stevens focused on. the "somewhat heavier burden" the
law placed on those who would have more difficulty in assembling the
proper documentation required and going through the necessary procedures for receiving a voter ID-elderly persons born out of state, the
low-income, the disabled, the homeless, and "persons with a religious
objection to being photographed." 126 Justice Stevens considered the "severity of [this] burden [to be] .

.

. mitigated by the fact that, if eligible,

voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will
ultimately be counted," even though this would require the voter to then
travel to the circuit court to execute the required affidavit.127
As the plaintiffs were advancing a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Voter ID Law, Justice Stevens stated that they "[bore] a
heavy burden of persuasion,"' 2 8 one that they were ultimately unable to
carry. Specifically, the plaintiffs' challenge was unsuccessful since, according to Justice Stevens, "[based on] the evidence in the record it is not
possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow
class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully
justified."' 129 The record did include depositional testimony from elderly,
indigent, and homeless voters, but Justice Stevens considered this anecdotal evidence to be "limited."' 130 Stating that the record did not provide
123 See id. at 1619 ("There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of the
State's interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters . . . [and] the interest in orderly
administration and accurate recordkeeping provides a sufficient justification for carefully identifying all voters participating in the election process.").
124 Id. at 1620. The lead opinion cursorily mentioned the State's asserted interest in "protecting public confidence in the integrity and legitimacy of representative government" as having "independent significance [] because it encourages citizen participation in the democratic
process." Id.
125 Id. at 1621; see also id. at 1620 ("A photo identification requirement imposes some
burdens on voters that other methods of identification do not share. For example, a voter may
lose his photo identification, may have his wallet stolen on the way to the polls, or may not
resemble the photo in the identification because he recently grew a beard. Burdens of that sort
arising from life's vagaries, however, are neither so serious nor so frequent as to raise any
question about the constitutionality of [the Voter ID Law].").
126 Id. at 1621.
127 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621 (2008)
128 Id.
129 Id. at 1622.
130 See id.
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concrete evidence as to the number of such burdened voters and the specific burdens that would be imposed on them, he did not examine the
"special burden" that the law placed on particular classes of voters for
131
whom obtaining the proper identification would be more burdensome.
Ultimately, Justice Stevens ruled that since the evidence was insufficient to support a claim that the law imposed an improper burden on a
specific class of voters, the plaintiffs' facial challenge must be consid' 132
ered in light of the law's "broad application to all Indiana voters."
Evaluating the law's impact on all voters, Justice Stevens found the burden imposed to be "limited" and not "substantial," 133 and therefore the
"'precise interests' advanced by the State [were] ...sufficient to defeat"
134
the plaintiffs' facial challenge to the Voter ID Law.
b.

Justice Scalia's Concurrence

Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito concurred in the lead opinion's
result, but, in a separate opinion by Justice Scalia, approved not only
Indiana's law, but also any generally-applicable voter identification law
that was passed absent intentional discrimination or a severe and widespread impact on voters. 135 Justice Scalia read Burdick as providing a
bright line rule in cases asserting a burden on the right to vote but not
intentional discrimination-if the Court determined that an asserted burden was "severe," then strict scrutiny should apply in evaluating the law;
if the burden was not "severe," then the Court should be deferential in its
review. 136 Justice Scalia thought that "ordinary and widespread burdens,
137
such as those requiring 'nominal effort' of everyone are not severe,"'
and thus should be reviewed with deference to the state. Concluding that
the Indiana law was neither intentionally discriminatory nor imposed a
severe burden on the right to vote generally, the concurring Justices
138
voted to uphold the statute.
However, Justice Scalia sharply disagreed with the lead opinion's
analysis being based on a lack of evidentiary record of the Voter ID
Law's individual impact. 139 Justice Scalia believed that courts should
131 See id.
132 Id. at 1623.

133 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1621, 1623 (2008).
134 Id.

at 1623.

135 See id. at 1624-27 (Scalia, J., concurring); Levitt, More Rhetorical Bark, supra note
110.
136 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624-25 (Scalia, J., concurring); Photo Identification
Requirementfor In-Person Voting, supra note 84, at 358-59.
137 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Clingman v. Beaver,

554 U.S. 581, 591 (2005)).
138 See id.

139 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1625 (2008) (Scalia, J.,

concurring).
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always evaluate voting regulations in light of their impact on voters generally.' 40 Indeed, Justice Scalia rejected the entire framework the lead
opinion used when it balanced the impact of the Voter ID Law against
the interests of Indiana in determining what level of scrutiny to apply.' 4 1
He believed that "[t]he lead opinion's record-based resolution of these
cases ... provides no certainty, and will embolden litigants .... ,,142
c.

The Dissents

Although Justice Souter agreed with Justice Stevens' reading of
Burdick as requiring a balancing test of burdens and justifications, while
Justice Stevens was deferential to Indiana's asserted interests and required the plaintiffs to provide evidence of improper burdens, Justice
Souter's dissent, in which Justice Ginsberg joined, stated that the Voter
ID Law was unconstitutional, claiming that "a State may not burden the
right to vote merely by invoking abstract interests, be they legitimate...
or even compelling, but must make a particular, factual showing that
threats to its interests outweigh the particular impediments it has imposed." 143 Because Indiana did not provide such justifications, Justice
Souter thought the law was unconstitutional for imposing an additional
burden on the right to vote. 144
Justice Souter began his analysis with an identification of the burdens that would be placed on voters under the law, 145 but did so in the
context of the burdens placed on specific classes of voters uniquely burdened by it-the elderly, the disabled, and the indigent. 146 He considered the costs attendant to obtaining photo identification, which he
identified as "economic costs" to voting in terms of work time lost and
transportation and other costs,' 47 to possibly be prohibitive for such voters.' 48 In addition, Justice Souter also identified the fees required for
obtaining the requisite background materials in order to get a voter ID. 149
Even if these costs would "not be shocking on their face . . .[they] are

disproportionately heavy for, and thus disproportionately likely to deter,
the poor, the old, and the immobile."' 150 Indeed, the relief Indiana pro140 See id.

141 See id. at 1624.
142 Id. at 1627.

143 Id. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
144 See id. at 1627-43; see also Levitt, More Rhetorical Bark, supra note 110.
145 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1627-28 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 1628-31; Photo Identification Requirementfor In-Person Voting, supra note
86, at 359.
147 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1630 (Souter, J., dissenting).
148 See id. at 1628-29.
149 See id. at 1630-31.
150 Id. at 1631.
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vides for the voters unable to comply with the Voter ID Law at the time
of voting-namely, the provisional ballot and requisite trip to the circuit
court to affirm by affidavit-is burdensome on these voters for the very
same reasons. 15 1 While Justice Souter agreed that the plaintiffs failed to
provide an exact count of the number of voters who would be deterred
from voting due to the law, he claimed that the "petitioners' case is
clearly strong enough to prompt more than a cursory examination of the
52
State's asserted interests."1
Thus, in contrast to the lead opinion, Justice Souter evaluated each
of the State's asserted interests in detail. On the interests of modernizing
election procedures and preventing voter fraud, Justice Souter focused on
the fact that there was no "evidence whatsoever of in-person voter impersonation fraud in the State."'153 Indeed, Justice Souter thought that the
asserted goal of preventing voter impersonation fraud was, at best, tilting
at windmills-there was no evidence of in-person voter impersonation in
any other part of the country either.' 5 4 While Justice Souter was willing
to stipulate that Indiana has an interest in responding to the risk of inperson voter fraud, 155 in light of the lack of evidence of such fraud and in
light of other factors that strongly weighed against Indiana's purported
interest in deterring voter fraud, 156 he thought that Indiana's interest
157
should have been accorded modest significance.
While Justice Stevens demanded evidence from the plaintiffs, Justice Souter did so of the State, finding it "simply not plausible to assume
here, with no evidence of in-person voter impersonation fraud in a State,
and very little of it nationwide, that a public perception of such fraud is
nevertheless 'inherent' in an election system providing severe criminal
1 58
Juspenalties for fraud and mandating signature checks at the polls."'
tice Souter thus thought the law was unconstitutional because Indiana
59
failed to justify the burdens it placed on the right to vote.'
151 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1631-32 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
152 Id.

153

Id. at 1637.

154 See id. (citing Lipton & Urbina, supra note 68 ("Five years after the Bush Administra-

tion began a crackdown on voter fraud, the Justice Department has turned up virtually no
evidence of any organized effort to skew federal elections, according to court records and

interviews.")).
155 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1639 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156 See id. at 1636-40.
157 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1641 (2008) (Souter,
J., dissenting). Justice Souter also dismissed the State's asserted interests in offsetting its own
inflated voter-lists and in protecting voter confidence in elections systems as being unrelated to
the enactment of the Voter ID Law. See id. at 1641-42.
158 Id. at 1642.
159 See id. at 1642-43.
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Justice Breyer similarly dissented on the grounds that Indiana offered no defense of its law to justify its restrictions, which were more
restrictive than any other in the country. 160 Justice Breyer thought that
"the Constitution does not automatically forbid Indiana from enacting a
photo ID requirement," 16' but he thought that the burden the Voter ID
Law imposed on voters was not insubstantial, and was indeed disproportionately burdensome for those without a government issued photo identification, thus rendering the law unconstitutional. 162 Justice Breyer's
standard of justification appears to be lower than Justice Souter's however, as Justice Breyer favorably cited other states' voter laws, although
he was at pains to note that he did not consider them constitutional, per
63
se. 1
D.

The Result of the Court's FracturedDecision: Constitutional
Confusion Continues

The Crawford Court split into three (or four) camps-the three Justices in the lead opinion who believed that more evidence of specific
burdens imposed by the law was necessary to invalidate it; three Justices
who would always uphold generally applicable voting requirements absent intentional discrimination or a severe burden imposed; and three
Justices who thought the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of burdens to require the Court to at least scrutinize the asserted interests behind the law, a scrutiny Indiana would not have been able to pass based
on the justifications it provided. 164 Six Justices applied some form of
balancing test, 165 yet split over how to do so.' 66 Only two of the Justices
described the right to vote as "fundamental."' 167 The result is an unclear
standard that has not resolved the substantive constitutional question
over mandatory photographic identification and other strict voter identifi168
cation laws.
160 See id.at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Levitt, More Rhetorical Bark,
supra note 110.
161 Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1644 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
162 See id. at 1644-45.
163 See Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1644-45 (2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
164 See Justin Levitt, Supreme Court Voter ID Decision More of a Whimper Than a Bang,
ACS Blog, http://www.acslaw.org/node/12360 (May 1, 2008, 10:54 EST); see also Douglas,
Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 146 ("[T]he Court issued four different opinions that each
described the proper methodology in different ways.").
165 See Basile, supra note 82, at 447; Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 156.
166 See Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 154-55.
167 Id. at 157.
168 See Basile, supra note 82, at 431; Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 154; Pitts,
supra note 27, at 475-76 ("[lIt may not be an exaggeration to remark that the Court's decision
merely served to breathe additional life into the battle over photo identification."); Jensen,
supra note 17, at 551 ("The decision in Crawford... did not provide a clear legal standard.
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Scholars have criticized the constitutional analysis in the lead opin169
ion for, among other flaws, improperly applying the Burdick test,' failright to vote under
ing to articulate how to measure the burden on the
171
Burdick,170 and misconstruing Harper v. Virginia.
The best reading of Crawford is that the three Justices of the lead
opinion and the three dissenting Justices all essentially applied what Professor Christopher Elmendorf has called the "individual rights model of
Burdick."'172 Under this framework, a voting requirement creates a "severe" burden if it represents a substantial impediment to voting for some
citizens but not for others. 173 This flows from the rule that what the
Constitution protects is the right to vote on equal terms with others; as
such, the right to vote is a personal, individualized right-a state's decision to mandate a specific voting protocol is unconstitutional vis-a-vis
any voter for whom compliance would entail unusual hardship due to
personal circumstances for which the voter cannot be faulted. 174 Once a
plaintiff-voter demonstrates a specific burden, the law can be applied to
the voter only if the state can justify the burden. 175 Under this model, the
burden the Court should consider is the size of the hurdle the plaintiffvoter faces relative to the size of the hurdle other voters face. Indeed,
although they differed in the amount of evidence they required from the
state and plaintiff-challengers, the three Justices of the lead opinion and
the three dissenting Justices all appeared to believe that the burden of a
voting requirement should be assessed from the point of view of those
voters whom it affects most harshly, 17 6 and all adhered to the sliding
scale of the Burdick test wherein the more severe the burden on these
voters' rights, the greater the state's interests must be to justify it.177

However, because these Justices differed in how they evaluated the burdens and state interests asserted, no coherent standard for how to apply
this balancing test emerged.
The Court neither resolved the ambiguity of Burdick nor did it provide a test on how to measure a burden on the right to vote."); Levitt, More Rhetorical Bark, supra note 110; cf Ian
McMullen, Constitutional Burdens on the Right to Vote: Crawford v. Marion County Election
Board, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1007, 1022 (2009) (stating Crawford is instructive in that it "illus-

trates the fine distinctions in an election law challenge and establishes what a plaintiffs burden
is in bringing such a challenge").
169 See Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 154-55; Jensen, supra note 17, at 547,
551-52.
170 See Jensen, supra note 17, at 551-56.
171 See Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 154-55.
172
173
174
175

See Elmendorf, supra note 78, at 659.
Id.
See id. at 659-60.

Id. at 660.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624-27 (2008)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting this approach).
177 See also Elmendorf, supra note 78, at 662-63.
176 Cf
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Numerous scholars have proposed alternative theories for how the
Court decided Crawford and how future cases implicating the right to
vote should be analyzed by the Court. 178 However, these theories will
not be the focus of this Note.
E.

The Roberts Court and Facial v. As-Applied Constitutional
Challenges

As Crawford did not settle the substantive constitutional question
over mandatory photo identification laws, perhaps the most important
result of the decision is the effect it will have on the nature of the inevitable future legal challenges to strict voter identification laws. The focus
of the Crawford lead opinion on the facial nature of the plaintiffs' challenges further demonstrated the Roberts Court's hostility to facial constitutional challenges, which, combined with the concurring Justices'
threshold requirement of intentional discrimination or a "severe" burden
on voters generally, appears to have effectively foreclosed the use of
facial challenges to generally applicable elections laws that burden particular voters-historically the most powerful tool for civil rights advocates against unconstitutional and restrictive laws. 179
While the Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in its
statements about the legal standards governing facial challenges, under
the strict view that the Justices have recently endorsed, to prevail on a
facial challenge, a plaintiff must prove that a statue is unconstitutional in
all of its applications; in an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff must only
show that the law is unconstitutional given a certain set of facts and as it
is applied to her and other similarly situated persons.180 In finding a
statute facially unconstitutional, a court invalidates the law in its entirety;
in finding a statute unconstitutional as-applied, a court's possible responses are generally more limited, including exempting the plaintiff and
those similarly situated, or voiding only so much of the statute as was at
issue in the case. 18 1

178 See, e.g., Basile, supra note 82; Benson, supra note 6;

Douglas, Right to Vote, supra

note 81; Ellis, supra note 6; Jensen, supra note 17.
179 See David G. Savage, About Face, ABA JOURNAL, Jul. 2008, at 21.
180 See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.

235, 236 (1994) (discussing the Court's inconsistent application of this test as elucidated
in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)); see also Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S.
REV.

Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court's Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV.

1644, 1646 (2009).
181 Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 180, at 1647 (citing Doff, supra note 180, at 236;
KATHLEEN SULLIVAN

&

GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1081 (16th ed. 2007)).
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The Crawford decision was part of the Roberts Court's developing
trend of rejecting facial constitutional challenges. 182 This disfavor for
facial challenges was most clearly expressed in Washington State
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, in which the Court denied
a facial challenge to Washington's newly enacted ballot law. 83 There,
in a crucial passage that is "of particular importance in understanding
Justice Stevens' opinion in Crawford,"'184 Justice Thomas wrote:
Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons.
Claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As
a consequence, they raise the risk of premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of factually barebones
records. Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should
neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied. Finally, facial
challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being implemented in a manner consistent with
the Constitution. We must keep in mind that a ruling of
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected
85
representatives of the people.1
In Crawford, Justice Stevens stated that this reasoning "applied with
added force,"' 18 6 and stated that facial constitutional challenges will
87
rarely prevail. 1
While the Supreme Court has previously expressed disfavor for facial challenges, 188 this renewed hostility has an acute effect in the con182 See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 180, at 1658; Michael Dorf, The Roberts Court
on FacialChullenges, Dorf on Law, http://www.michaeldorf.org/2008/04/roberts-court-on-facial-challenges.html, (April 29, 2008, 14:43 EST) (citing Gonzales v. Carhardt, 550 U.S. 124
(2007) (partial-birth abortion); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (death penalty)); see also
Vikram David Amar, What the Supreme Court's Recent Decision Upholding Indiana's Voter
ID Law Tells Us About the Court, Beyond the Area of Election Law, FINDLAW'S WRrr, May 8,
2008, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20080508.html; Savage, supra note 179, at 21.
183 See 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008).
184 Jensen, supra note 17, at 560.
185 Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1191.
186 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622 (2008); see Ellen
Katz, Withdrawal: The Roberts Court and the Retreatfrom Election Law, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1615, 1629 (2009); Jensen, supra note 17, at 561.
187 See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1622-24; Katz, supra note 186, at 1629.
188 See Dorf, supra note 180, at 236 (discussing the Court's disfavor for facial challenges
in light of United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).
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text of voting rights cases.1 89 A de facto requirement for as-applied
challenges presents numerous hurdles for litigants seeking to vindicate
individual rights.' 90 It forces plaintiffs to suffer a constitutional injury
before such rights can be vindicated in after-the-fact proceedings. 91
This situation is exacerbated in the context of voting rights cases, and in
particular, voter identification cases. In light of the absence of definitive
empirical data on the numbers of voters burdened by mandatory photo
identification laws, 192 and the disfavor that courts have shown to the data
that has been presented by advocates, 193 it is unclear how voting rights
plaintiffs would be able to produce broad classes of voters burdened by
such laws in order to vindicate their right to vote ex ante. The Supreme
Court's dismissal of arguments of indirect costs for lower socioeconomic
voters in their attempts to comply with the law, and the difficulty obtaining evidence of widespread burdens caused by such laws' application,1 94 may thus lead to the widespread disenfranchising of these voters,
as an unconstitutional law may continue to be effective (and excessively
burden a particular class of voters) because "no one has brought a suc195
cessful as-applied suit to challenge that application of the law."'
Furthermore, successful as-applied challenges can only bring about
constitutional change in a slow, gradual manner, because the relief such
challenges produce is often limited to the plaintiffs in the specific
case. 196 Under the current Court's approach, this limited range of available remedies may result in no real relief ever being afforded because

189 See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 180, at 1658-75; see generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 635 (2009) [hereinafter Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law].
190 Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 642.
191 See id. at 635-36 (citing Richard L. Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the
Stage for Shrinking Voting Rights, Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially In Danger,

Mar. 26, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/20080326_hasen.html
[hereinafter Hasen, About Face]); id. at 677 ("[A]ny relief is possible only after voters suffer a
violation of their constitutional rights during an election and then can demonstrate the effect of
the law as applied to them.").
192 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
193 See, e.g., Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 803 (S.D. Ind.
2006); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
194 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 1064.
FINDLAW.COM,

195 Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 638.
196 Id. at 642, 676.
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such as-applied challenges are unlikely to prevail frequently, 197 and
19 8
when they do, the relief afforded will be limited.
The practical effects of this shift towards only as-applied challenges
are significant. The Crawford lead opinion's demand for stronger evidence of the burdens strict voter identification laws impose on a specific
class as a condition for sustaining a facial constitutional challenge to that
law, 199 combined with the concurring opinion's analysis of Burdick as
requiring a threshold determination of whether a voter identification law
imposes a "severe" burden on all voters generally, 200 will hamper future
facial challenges to possibly unconstitutional voter identification laws by
requiring a level of evidence that is extremely difficult to assemble prior
to the enforcement of such laws
In light of this shift, voting rights advocates seeking to remedy the
possibly unconstitutional burdens strict voter identification laws place on
the right to vote for vulnerable voting populations should reassess their
strategies and responses. The remainder of this Note will propose how
advocates may do so.
III.

THE PATH FORWARD: LEGISLATIVELY ALLEVIATING THE
CUMULATIVE BURDENS ON THE RIGHT TO VOTE

In light of the Crawford decision, there is a strong possibility that

strict voter identification laws that may unconstitutionally burden the
right to vote of many vulnerable population groups will not only remain
on the books of some states, but will be promulgated in more states as
well. 20 1 The Crawford Court's failure to articulate a coherent approach

to such laws will only exacerbate the confusion in lower courts adjudging the constitutional merits of strict voter identification schemes. Combined with evidence that the lower courts are following the Roberts
Court's burgeoning disfavor for facial constitutional challenges, 20

2

it ap-

197 See Amar, supra note 182 ("[H]ow likely is it that a would-be voter in Indiana who
can't afford the money it takes to get a birth certificate (which is necessary to get a government ID) or the money it takes to obtain transportation to the county seat (where she could
explain her inability to get a birth certificate) is somehow going to have the money and knowledge to bring suit in federal court instead, to demonstrate the unfairness of the burdens created
by the Indiana law as to her? And to do all that well in advance of the election in which she
wants to vote? In sum, for some claims and right-holders, it's facial challenge or bust. Thus,
in turning away facial challenges in cases like these, the Court may seem to be leaving a path
for as-applied challenges, but in practice, it may well be effectively foreclosing any meaningful challenge at all."); Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at
676.
198 See Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 673-74
199 See supra notes 128-131 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 135-138 and accompanying text.
201 See Urbina, supra note 62.
202 See Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 673-74. See
generally id., Part Il.
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pears that voting rights advocates will face significant hurdles in future
attempts to vindicate, ex ante, the right to vote for vulnerable voting
populations by relying on a litigation strategy.
For these reasons, this Note will argue that the more propitious path
forward for voting rights advocates concerned about the possible suppression of certain voting populations would be an effort to secure a federal legislative response that could help reduce the cumulative burdens
imposed on the right to vote. Through federal legislation creating universal voter registration, or at least significantly expanding the registration opportunities for those population groups disproportionately
burdened by strict voter identification laws, Congress can do what the
Supreme Court failed to do in Crawford-proactively protect the right to
vote of the most vulnerable population groups. However, absent legislative relief for those voters disproportionately burdened by restrictive
voter identification laws, legal challenges to such laws should not be
abandoned.
A.

A Refocused Legal Response
1. Federal Court Challenges

In light of the Roberts Court's disfavor for facial constitutional challenges, 20 3 and the Crawford lead opinion's demand for specific evidence
of burdened voters to sustain a facial challenge, 204 the prospects for the
success of future facial challenges to burdensome voter identification
laws are not promising. The frame of reference for voting rights advocate-litigants challenging burdensome voter identification laws should be
the three Justices of the lead opinion who are theoretically open to invalidating voter identification laws based on a finding of unconstitutional
burdens on the right to vote of particular voting populations, but who
demand rigorous evidence of such laws' actual effects on specific voters.
The lead opinion allows a state to assert an interest in preventing
voter fraud without actually proving the existence of such fraud, but requires challengers of the law to produce actual voters disenfranchised by
the law. It is this predicate-the need to provide voters too poor to afford necessary documentation or otherwise too burdened by the law's
requirements-that is the key for future litigants challenging strict voter
identification laws. 20 5 Justice Souter's retirement and replacement by
Justice Sotomayor would not seem to change this calculus, as no group
203 See
204 See
evidence in
statute ....
205 See

supra Part II.E.
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616 (2008) ("[Tlhe
the record is not sufficient to support a facial attack on the validity of the entire
"); see also supra notes 125-131 and accompanying text.
Hasen, About Face, supra note 191.
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of Justices with whom Justice Sotomayor could join would command a
majority of votes.
While the lead opinion dismissed the burdens mandatory photo
identification laws place on voters generally,2 0 6 robust data of a certain
class (or classes) of voters being sufficiently burdened might convince
the Justices of the lead opinion to invalidate a burdensome voter identification law. 20 7 However, recent attempts to compile such data have been
inconclusive. 20 8 Absent a concerted effort to compile the more reliable
empirical data needed to support a pre-enforcement facial charge of unconstitutional burdens in light of Crawford, challengers to restrictive and
possibly unconstitutional voter identification laws are stuck in the
unenviable position of relying on as-applied challenges based on voters
who have already suffered an unconstitutional burden on their right to
209
vote.
While the concerns over the shift to only as-applied challenges are
serious, perhaps advocates should be relieved that Justice Stevens wrote
the lead opinion premised on the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges, which at least leaves the door open for future challenges. 2 10 Indeed, some commentators have suggested that this was
possibly a strategic vote by some of the Justices to allow for future,
stronger challenges to strict voter identification laws where plaintiffs
could produce hard evidence of the suppressive effects of such laws. 2 1'
As-applied challenges are more likely to be successful in challenging statutory schemes that portend possible disenfranchisement of vulnerable population groups, 212 and many anticipate such claims will be
the next wave of challenges to restrictive voter eligibility laws-challenges which the Crawford decision will only encourage. 2 13 However,
206
207
208

See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621.
See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 180, at 1671.
See, e.g., Erickson & Minnite, supra note 72; Minnite, supra note 74; Pitts, supra note

27.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
See Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 678; Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81, at 172; Levitt, Just the Facts, supra note 119; Levitt, More
Rhetorical Bark, supra note 110.
211 See, e.g., Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 678;
Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 180, at 1646; Linda Greenhouse, In Latest Term, Majority
Grows To More Than 5 of the Justices, N.Y. TIMES, at AI (May 23, 2008) ("So perhaps there
was a bit of movement on both sides - not simple liberal capitulation, but liberals using their
limited leverage to exact some modest concessions as the price of helping the conservatives
avoid another parade of 5-to-4 decisions.").
212 See Levitt, More Rhetorical Bark, supra note 110.
213 See, e.g., Doug Chapin, Director's Note: The Supreme Court's Crawford Opinion:
Now What?, ELECTIONLINE WEEKLY, May 1, 2008, http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/
uploadedFiles/wwwpewcenteronthestatesorg/Reports/Electionline-Reports/eectionlineWeekly
05.01.08.pdf; see also Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1627 (2008)
(Scalia, J.,concurring) ("The lead opinion's record-based resolution of these cases, which
209
210
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as noted, as-applied challenges will yield only limited, halting results,
even if successful. 2 14 Even if a voter identification law is found to have
unconstitutionally burdened a voter, a court will likely narrowly tailor its
response to minimize the impact on a generally applicable voter eligibility law. 2 15 Furthermore, this strategy will require voters to be unconsti-

2 16
tutionally burdened by laws before they are able to bring such claims.
Overlaying all these procedural hurdles is the federal courts' inconsistent protection and analysis of the right to vote generally, 217 and the
overall shift by the Roberts Court away from involvement in the minu21 8
tiae of state election law.

Thus, while legal challenges should not be abandoned, especially in
light of the opening the lead opinion left for as-applied challenges to
sufficiently burdensome voter identification laws, voting rights advocates
should no longer rely on federal courts to vindicate the rights of burdened voter groups.2 19 Instead, voting rights advocates should look to
legislative responses to this problem.
2.

State Court Challenges

Advocates challenging the legality of suppressive voter identification schemes should continue to bring challenges in state courts as well.
The main Supreme Court cases that have severely limited the available
litigation tools and possible remedies for voting rights advocates-Washington State Grange and Crawford-"have had very little impact on state
courts"

220

because they "bind state courts only when the courts construe

federal law."'22 1 Indeed, in a subsequent state court case challenging the
Voter ID Law that was upheld in Crawford, the Indiana Court of Appeals
invalidated the law under the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Indiana Constitution, 2 22 which differs from the Equal Protection
neither
bolden
214
215
216
217
218

rejects nor embraces the rule of our precedents, provides no certainty, and will emlitigants who surmise that our precedents have been abandoned.").
See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
See Douglas, Right to Vote, supra note 81.
See Katz, supra note 186, at 1626. But cf Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave It To The Lower

Courts: On Judicial Intervention In Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1065 (2007)
(arguing that the lower courts have "capably" handled the uptick in election law litigation after
Bush v. Gore).
219 Cf. Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 642-45
(describing the Warren Court's role as a bulwark against unconstitutional state election laws).
220 Id. at 660.
221 Id. at 663; cf. League of Women Voters of Indiana, Inc. v. Rokita, No. 49A02-0901CV-40, 2009 WL 2973120, at *5 (Ind.Ct. App. 2009) ("[I]nterpretation of the Indiana Constitution is an independent judicial act in which federal cases play only a persuasive role.")
(citations omitted).
222 See League of Women Voters of Indiana, 2009 WL 2973120, at * 12.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in that "it does not require an analytical framework applying varying degrees of scrutiny for different protected interests.

' 223

Specifically, the Indiana Court of Appeals found it

"irrational" for the state to "require identification of in-person voters but
not require an affidavit affirming the identity of mail-in voters,' 224 and to
allow those voters in state-licensed care facilities to vote without photo
identification. 225 As "the CrawfordCourt did not make any ruling whatsoever regarding the Voter ID Law and the Indiana Constitution," 226 the
Indiana court was free to engage in this independent state constitutional
analysis.
This was not an outlying case. In many states, due to the state's
history and tradition, textual differences in the state constitution, or the
prevailing state court interpretations, the state constitution is often read
more expansively to protect a right than the analogous federal constitutional right is in federal court. 22 7 Indeed, prominent jurists and scholars
have trumpeted state constitutions as avenues for the more vigorous protection of individual rights than the sometimes reluctant or hostile federal
judiciary. 228 Thus, voting rights advocates should not forget the availability of state courts as alternative avenues for remedying possibly unconstitutional burdens imposed by state voter identification laws.
However, voting rights advocates should recognize that due to the
vast differences in state constitutions, and in the absence of a clear federal constitutional rule, state courts may produce disparate results regarding strict voter identification laws. 229 Furthermore, independent state

constitutional law and analysis is not fully developed in many areas of
law, and "lock-step" interpretation of constitutional rights with the pre230
vailing federal approach is frequent.
As such, advocates should not just focus on litigation responses in
order to alleviate the burdens voter identification laws impose on vulnerable voting populations, but should also focus on policy responses, particularly at the federal level where a more friendly administration and
223

Id. at *8.

224 Id.

at *9.

225 See id. at "15.
226 Id.
227

See

at *4.
RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 65 (7th ed. 2009).
228 See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147 (1993).
229 Compare Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006) (striking down Missouri's
voter identification law on state constitutional grounds) with In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444 (Mich. 2007) (finding Michigan's voter identification law constitutional).
230 See G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism In Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1097, 1116-17 (1997).
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Congress might be receptive to providing legislative relief for those vot23
ers disproportionately burdened by strict voter identification statutes. '
B.

A Proposed Policy Response: Voter Registration Reform as a
Means to Alleviate the Cumulative Burdens on the Right to
Vote

Justice Souter identified some of the costs strict voter identification
schemes impose on voters as "economic costs. '23 2 But these are not the
only costs placed on voters seeking to exercise the right to vote. 233 The
"structural cost" of registration still exists as a threshold hurdle many
voters do not overcome. 234 For example, a much cited CalTech/MIT report after the 2000 election estimated that up to three million voters were
unable to vote due to registration problems. 235 However, only recently
have the problems attendant to voter registration schemes become the
236
subject of scholarly work.
Voter registration issues disproportionately affect and form a barrier
to the political participation of lower socioeconomic voters, 237 the same
population group disproportionately affected by strict voter identifications schemes. This Note contends that by eliminating the hurdles imposed by voter registration, the elected branches of the federal
government could do what the Supreme Court failed to do in Crawford-address the cumulative burdens on the right to vote that strict voter
identification laws have exacerbated for lower socioeconomic and other
vulnerable voting populations.
1. Why a Federal Response?
Congress has the power to regulate federal elections under Article I,
Section 4 of the federal Constitution, 2 38 and given the inefficiencies in
231 Professor Tokaji is more confident in the judiciary playing an integral part in protecting broader voting rights, including cases of voter identification requirements, see Tokaji,
Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 494-95, but he recognizes that litigation alone will not be
sufficient to eliminate the burdens imposed on voters by onerous voter registration and identification laws. See id.
232 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1630 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
233 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 1032-36.
234 See id. at 1033; see also Jason P.W. Halperin, Note, A Winner at the Polls: A Proposal
for Mandatory Voter Registration, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEcus & PUB. POL'Y 69, 94-95 (1999).
235 See Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Voting: What Is And What Could Be 27
(2001), http://vote.caltech.edu/drupal/files/report/voting-whatj is-what couldbe.pdf.
236 See Tokaji, Voter Registration,supra note 6, at 454-55; cf id. (surveying and analyzing the state of voter registration law).
237 See Ellis, supra note 6, at 1035; Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 496-97.
238 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 ("The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of
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of
maintaining separate databases for state and federal elections, 239 use 240
this power can vastly change the landscape on voting registration.
With President Obama and the Democratic Party, which has a majority in
both houses of the 111th Congress, staking out strong positions on voting
rights, 24 1 voting rights advocates should seize this unique opportunity to
seek the passage of federal legislation that alleviates the cumulative bur242
dens on the right to vote.

The Carter-Baker Commission specifically recommended that state
governments take on an affirmative obligation concomitant to the imposition of any voter identification requirement. 243 As such, it recommended certain steps states could take to counterbalance the burdens that
would be imposed by stricter voter identification requirements, such as
the creation of "ombudsman institutions" to respond to claims of abuse
of voter identification requirements, 2 44 the encouragement of increased
state-to-state information sharing about voters who have moved, 245 and
other enhanced voter registration list updating methods. 24 6 It also
vaguely encouraged states to use their "best efforts to make voter registration and ID accessible and available to all eligible citizens," 247 and to
increase access to registration services. 24 8 While these are all fine ideas
that should be pursued, the Carter-Baker Commission's recommendations-which at least recognize that strict voter identification laws
should not be enacted without complementary provisions addressing the
increased burdens these laws impose-are fundamentally flawed in that
choosing Senators."); see Voting Rights Coalition v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996).
239 See Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 467-68.
240 Cf.id. (describing effect of NVRA).
241 See, e.g., Whitehouse.gov, "Civil Rights," http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/CIVIL
RIGHTS/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2009) ('The President is committed to expanding funding for
the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division to ensure that voting rights are protected and
Americans do not suffer from increased discrimination during a time of economic distress.");
Press Release, Democratic National Committee, DNC Announces Unprecedented Election
Protection Project, (Aug. 7, 2007), http://democrats.org/a/2007/08/dnc-announcesu.php
("While the Democratic Party continues to work to protect every American's right to vote and
have that vote counted, Republicans have aimed to create roadblocks for Americans to exercise their right to vote through restrictive voter ID laws, voter purging, and voter intimidation
tactics."); see also Deceptive Practices and Voter Intimidation Prevention Act of 2005, S.
1975, 109th Cong. (lst Sess. 2005) (legislation introduced by then-Senator Obama "to prohibit
deceptive practices in Federal elections").
242 Cf.David Herbert, The Morning After, Voting Problems Remain, NAT'L J., Nov. 19,
2008, http://www.nationaljoumal.com/njonline/no_20081117-9032.php (discussing continuing calls for election law reform).
243 See CARTER-BAKER REPORT, supra note 15, at ii.
244 See id. at 21.
245 See id. at 23.
246 See id. at 22-23.
247 Id. at 34.
248 See id. at 39-40.
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they are primarily a set of recommendations for state legislatures, with
increased funding from the national government as the only federal overlay. 249 It is highly unlikely the same state legislatures that passed stand-

alone voter identification requirements, despite the demonstrated burdens
such laws would impose, would supplement these laws to mitigate these
burdens-especially since the Crawford Court did not mandate such
alleviation.
Indeed, this problem severely undercuts the possible effectiveness
of many of the proposed policy responses that rely on the states to remedy their own flawed statutory schemes. 2 50 This includes more federally-oriented policy proposals that make additional federal funding
contingent on the states satisfying certain criteria, 251 the fulfillment of
which will ultimately be optional for the states. Unless the federal government imposes new rules that must be accepted by the states for federal
elections, the states that have chosen to impose strict voter identification
requirements will have little incentive to remedy the burdens imposed on
voters.
2.

Why Voter Registration Law?

Since Congress has broad constitutional authority to regulate federal
elections, 252 it could theoretically enact a uniform identification requirement for all federal elections that would effectively preempt more restrictive state voter identification schemes. 25 3 Indeed, such a response would
more directly alleviate the burdens that strict state voter identification
laws impose on vulnerable voting populations by effectively rolling back
such state restrictions to the federal standard.
However, such a proposal, despite its substantive merits as a more
efficient means of alleviating the burdens imposed by strict voter identification schemes, is flawed as a viable public policy proposal because it
is susceptible to the same political criticism as the aforementioned state
voter identification laws-it primarily benefits only one political
party. 254 A federal identification law that reduced only the identification
249 See id. at 33-44.
250 Although proposed before Crawford was decided, Professor Overton's possible policy

supplements and alternatives are essentially flawed by this same reliance on individual states
to remedy the negative burdens their own existing laws impose. See Overton, supra note 6.
251 See, e.g., Thad Hall & Daniel P. Tokaji, Money for Data: Funding the Oldest Un-

funded Mandate, ELECTION

LAW AT MoPrrz, June 5, 2007, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election

law/comments/articles.php?ID= 153.
252 See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
253 Cf supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (describing the impracticability of
maintaining separate elections databases for federal and state elections).
254 Cf supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (recounting both sides of the voter
identification debate accusing the other side of merely acting on the basis of political
motivations).
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required by individual states would offer nothing to the primarily Republican proponents of stricter voter identification schemes, would be portrayed as a nakedly partisan power grab by the Democratic Partycontrolled elected branches of the federal government, and would be assailed and delegitimized by partisan opponents on such grounds.
By comparison, voter registration reform is theoretically more palatable to both major political parties. As proposed in its optimal form below, it addresses policy concerns of both major political parties in a way
that a federal voter identification law would not-by working to alleviate
the cumulative burdens on the right to vote for vulnerable voting populations (a Democratic Party concern) while also reducing the possibility for
voter registration fraud and the concomitant opportunity for exploitation
of the voter registration process for in-person voter fraud (a Republican
Party concern).
3.

The Imperfect Response: Expanded Opportunities for Voter
Registration

The federal government has worked to lessen registration burdens
through the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the National Voter Registration
Act, and HAVA. 255 These expansions of registration opportunities produced a significant increase in voter registrations in lower socioeconomic
voting populations 2 56-those most burdened by voter identification
257
laws-yet did not produce an increase in in-person voter fraud.
These registration opportunities alone do not help remedy the burdens imposed by strict voter identification laws however, because they
do not necessarily reach those who are the most burdened. While the
NVRA mandates that state offices that provide public assistance or disability services also offer voter registration opportunities and assistance to
258
those receiving such services in completing the necessary forms,
states' compliance with this requirement has been lacking. 2 59 An immediate response by the Obama administration, which would not require
any legislation, would be to direct the Department of Justice to enforce
compliance with this provision first, as states that have enforced this provision have shown significant gains through this method of voter regis255 See Wendy Weiser, Michael Waldman & Ren~e Paradis, Voter RegistrationModernization: Policy Summary, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1 (2008), http://brennan.3cdn.net/b75f
13413388b2fccc.ynm6bnll2.pdf; Tokaji, Voter Registration,supra note 6, at 498; supra Part
I.A.
256 See Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 469-70 (citing Robert D. Brown &
Justin Wedeking, People Who Have Their Tickets but Do Not Use Them: "Motor Voter,"
Registration,and Turnout Revisited, 34 AM. POL. RES. 479, 491-98 (2006)).
257 See id. at 495-96.
258 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg-5(a)(2), 1973gg-5(a)(4) (2006); Tokaji, Voter Registration,
supra note 6, at 468; supra note 43 and accompanying text.
259 See Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 484.
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tration. 260 Congress should also amend current legislation to expressly
allow private lawsuits to compel state compliance with the registration
26 1
laws currently on the books.
Furthermore, voters who do not drive (i.e., low-income voters, urban voters, older voters) are doubly burdened in that they do not have
access to the easiest method of registration (via the local DMV) or of
securing voter identification (a driver's license). 2 62 Expanding voter registration opportunities to those government services where such voters
actually interact with the government would help to remedy this imbalance. By expanding the NVRA provisions to cover those forms and government services these voters more frequently interact with-including,
but not limited to, the Selective Service System, the Post Office, the Social Security Administration, Medicare and Medicaid, the Internal Revenue Service 263-through the simple voter registration addendum that
already appears on driver's license applications, actual practice would
begin to more closely live up to the spirit of the Motor Voter Law by
reaching those who truly need its help.
However, such reforms will still place the burden of registering to
vote on individual voters. 264 The population groups most affected by
strict voter identification laws are those more likely to move often and
have to re-register each time, to have living situations that are not conducive for registering (such as temporary or assisted living housing), to lack
information on registering and access to it via the Internet, to lack the
ability to travel to registration sites, and to lack the discretionary time in
265
which to undertake the research and procedures necessary to vote.

Voter-initiated registration also creates problems when combined
with voter identification laws. When voters are required to register to
vote they may make mistakes or submit information that is not completely in line with their photographic identification (if they have one), or
they may fail to re-register or update their identification when moving

260 See id. at 484-85.
261 See id. at 494.

262 See id. at 485; see also Halperin, supra note 234, at 102.
263 See Richard L. Hasen, Registering Doubt: If we can nationalize banks, why not our
election process?, SLATE, Oct. 27, 2008, http://slate.msn.com/id/2203138/ [hereinafter Hasen,
Registering Doubt]. The proposal advanced here draws from elements of proposals election
law scholars refer to as "automatic registration" and "election federalization" schemes. See
Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 499, 501-03.
264 See Weiser et al., supra note 255, at 2; see also Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note
6, at 502.
265 See Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 937, 965 (2005) [hereinafter Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation]; Weiser et al., supra note 255, at 4-5.
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(thus making the photographic identification that does not match the re266
gistration useless).
This problem could be partially mitigated by allowing election day
267
(or "same-day") registration for participation in federal elections.
However, for this approach to actually be useful for those voters unduly
burdened by strict state voter identification schemes, the identification
requirements that would almost certainly be attendant to such a system
would have to allow for "lesser" identification to suffice for this registration-a difficult proposition to sell politically.
Furthermore, expanded voter registration opportunities alone also
do not solve the problem of "bloated" voter rolls and the problems attendant to third-party voter registration drives that fill the void left by
voter-initiated registration, which then present the asserted justifications
for strict voter identification laws and other possibly discriminatory prac26 8
tices like voter roll purges.
Thus, while expanded voter registration opportunities may superficially appear to be the more feasible policy response, it is imperfect at
best; the more optimal response would be federal universal voter
registration.
4.

The Optimal Response: Universal Registration

The most promising proposal for a federal policy response is a comprehensive set of policy changes that advocates refer to as "universal
voter registration"-a structure whereby every eligible citizen is able to
vote because the government has the affirmative obligation to ensure
they are on the voter rolls permanently.2 69 While the burdens that such a
system would remove from voters are not the same as those that strict
state voter identification laws impose, universal registration would help
alleviate the cumulative burdens on the right to vote, and even eliminate
the main rationale for strict voter identification laws in the first placethe need to prevent in-person voter fraud that takes advantage of bloated
270
voter rolls and lax voter registration rules.
Government-run universal registration is standard practice in almost
27 1
every industrialized Western democracy except the United States.
See id. at 5-6.
Cf Halperin, supra note 234, at 105-08.
268 See Hasen, Registering Doubt, supra note 263.
269 See Weiser et al., supra note 255, at 1.
270 See id. at 4-5; cf Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1620
(2008) ("[I]nflated voters rolls [provide] a neutral and nondiscriminatory reason supporting the
State's decision to require photo identification.").
271 See Christopher Carmichael, Proposalsfor Reforming the American Electoral System
After the 2000 PresidentialElection: Universal Voter Registration, Mandatory Voting, and
Negative Balloting, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 255, 302 (2002); G. Bingham Powell, Jr.,
266
267
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Under a universal registration structure, the federal government would
assume the obligation to register all eligible voters for federal elections. 272 This approach would go beyond the model of the voter-initiated

Motor Voter Law, even if supplemented as suggested above, 273 and
would require affirmative governmental action to ensure that all eligible
voters are on the proper rolls to be able to vote.
Proposals for such a system often begin with the baseline of state
voter rolls, 2 74 which were required by HAVA to be computerized and

state-wide, 275 and expand to include proposals for census-style door-todoor registration, automatic registration when citizens turn 18, and automatic updating of registration information when a change of address
form is filed with the post office. 276 Such proposals should be supple-

mented by requiring the government to automatically update the information gained through these methods to include the information gleaned
from those interactions covered under the expanded Motor Voter Law
proposal above, 277 i.e., whenever the voter has interacted with the
government.
Such a system would address the concerns of Democrats interested
in increasing voter access to the polls and would also further Republican
interests in ensuring the sanctity of each individual ballot by reducing
some of the claimed causes and opportunities for potential in-person
voter and voter registration fraud. 278 Indeed, depending on the specific
configuration of the statutory scheme promulgating universal registration, this system may also address other frequently cited complaints
279
about contemporary elections systems in the United States.
American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 17, 21 (1986);
Halperin, supra note 234, at 97 (citing Richard M. Scammon & Jeanne Richman, Election
Reform in the United States, in ISSUES IN ELECTORAL REFORM 153, 158 (Richard J. Carlson
ed., 1974)).
272 Weiser et al., supra note 255, at 1.
273 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
274 See, e.g., Carmichael, supra note 271, at 302; R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall &
Morgan Llewelly, How Hard Can It Be: Do Citizens Think It Is Difficult To Register To Vote?,
18 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 382, 407-08 (2007); Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation,
supra note 265, at 970.
275 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. But cf Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra
note 6, at 471-72 (detailing difficulties many states have had in complying with this
requirement).
276 See, e.g., Hasen, Registering Doubt, supra note 263.
277 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
278 See Hasen, Registering Doubt, supra note 263.
279 See SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMoCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION 166-67 (W.W. Norton Press 2006) (advocating universal voter registration as a way
to eliminate fraud by the organizations currently conducting voter registration drives); Hasen,
Beyond the Margin of Litigation, supra note 265, at 970 (addressing how universal registration
would solve problems like voter registration fraud).
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One possible objection to this proposal is the opportunity this system might present for manipulation by partisan officials charged with
overseeing such registration efforts and databases. Indeed, the state election officials currently responsible for registration lists are frequently accused of manipulation by the opposition party. 28 0 To mitigate concerns
about political manipulation, the officials tasked with this responsibility
should be located in a federal agency, where more oversight and media
scrutiny is theoretically possible than at the state level; should be nominated and confirmed by the Senate, 28 1 to ensure vetting; and should be
protected against removal from office for reasons other than neglect of
duty or malfeasance (i.e., for political reasons). 282 Moreover, the federal
entity empowered to undertake this effort should be politically balanced. 283 Admittedly, this proposal places considerable faith in the confirmation and oversight process, and does not necessarily prevent the
possibility of a stalemate by the agency authorized to oversee universal
registration due to either a lack of quorum or a deadlock over proposed
2 84
action.
While a proposal for universal registration may seem radical now, it
should be noted that many of the proposed methods for expanding voter
registration in the 1970s that were decried as radical at the time by their
opponents-including allowing voters to register by mail-are now standard, and lauded, provisions of the NVRA. 285 Furthermore, if such legislation is passed, in light of Crawford and Washington State Grange and
the trend of federal courts to withdraw from adjudging the minutiae of
280 See, e.g., Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 5 (2008) (per curiam); Mary
Pat Flaherty, Ohio Litigating Its Way Through Election Cycle, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2008, at
A2.
281 Cf Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006) ("Commissioners... shall
be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.").
282 Cf id. ("Any Commissioner may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect
of duty, or malfeasance in office."); Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) (reading this provision to restrict the President's ability to remove appointees and up-

holding such a restriction).
283 Cf 15 U.S.C. § 41 ("Not more than three of the Commissioners shall be members of

the same political party.").
284 Cf Matthew Mosk, FEC Reduced to Offering Advice, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2008, at
A13 (describing stalemate at the Federal Election Commission caused by an insufficient num-

ber of members for quorum). But cf. 15 U.S.C. § 41 ("[U]pon the expiration of his term of
office a Commissioner shall continue to serve until his successor shall have been appointed

and shall have qualified."). For further treatment of these and other issues of institutional
capacity for broad election reform, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform, 28
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 125 (2009) (identifying decentralization and partisanship in election

administration as the primary structural hurdles to broad election law reform); Daniel P.
Tokaji, Voter Registration and Institutional Reform: Lessons from a Historic Election, 3

HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 12-16 (Online) (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.hlpronline.conrTokaji
_HLPR_012209.pdf.

285 See Halperin, supra note 234, at 90-91.
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much election law, the courts will be less likely to curtail such
286
provisions.
Universal registration is not a panacea for all the burdens that voter
identification laws may impose, 287 but it is a progressive policy response

that advocates discouraged by the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford
should pursue as a complementary response to litigation.
CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., the status of strict voter identification laws has been
strengthened, but not placed beyond the reach of constitutional challenges. Indeed, although the Court's decision was a setback for advocates bringing facial challenges to strict voter identification statutes, the
splintered plurality opinion left open the possibility that as-applied challenges to such laws may be successful if challengers can prove that the
laws improperly burden specific voters' right to vote. While such legal
challenges are still continuing, the remedies they are likely to win in light
of Crawford are limited.
Instead of relying solely on litigation to remedy the situation, voting
rights advocates should focus on ensuring passage of complementary
legislation at the federal level that may help alleviate the burdens placed
on low-income, elderly, disabled, and minority voters by strict voter
identification laws. The most promising possible federal response is
known as universal registration, and is a comprehensive scheme whereby
the government, not the individual voter, has the affirmative obligation to
ensure that every eligible voter is registered and able to vote. Such a
system would not directly alleviate all of the burdens imposed by strict
voter identification laws, but it would help reduce the cumulative burdens that exist on the right to vote for far too many in this country.

See Douglas, As-Applied Challenges in Election Law, supra note 189, at 682.
287 See Tokaji, Voter Registration, supra note 6, at 506.
286

